WILLIAMSBURG, VA
MAY 4TH - 5TH, 1862

Williamsburg, Va., May 4-5, 1862. 3rd and 4th Army Corps and Cavalry, Army of the Potomac. Upon the evacuation of Yorktown by the Confederates, Gen. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, ordered his cavalry, with four batteries of horse artillery, under the command of Brig.-Gen. George Stoneman, in pursuit, the infantry following as rapidly as possible. The 3rd corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. S. P Heintzelman, moved on the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg with Hooker's division in advance closely followed by Kearny's. The 4th corps, under command of Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes, took the Lee's Mill road farther to the left, Smith's division having the advance with the divisions of Couch and Casey in supporting distance. Near the Half-way house-so called because it was about half way between Yorktown and Willliamsburg-Stoneman's advance encountered some of the enemy's cavalry and the skirmishing commenced. Knowing that the Confederates were moving on both roads, Stoneman sent Emory's brigade to cut off the enemy on the Lee's Mill road, while he engaged the force in his front, gradually pressing it back to Fort Magruder, about a mile from Williamsburg. Fort Magruder was the largest of a line of redoubts which had been constructed sometime before by Gen. Magruder, commanding the Confederate forces on the lower peninsula. When Stoneman came in sight this was the only one of the redoubts occupied, but Gen. J. E. Johnston, who was conducting the retreat, hurried troops to the rear to man the trenches before Stoneman's supports could come up. Emory encountered a regiment of Confederate cavalry on the Lee's Mill Toad, under the command of Gen. Stuart himself, but without infantry could not corner the enemy. Some confusion arose in the movements of the Federal infantry. McClellan had remained at Yorktown to direct the movements of Franklin's division of McDowell's corps, which had been ordered to the peninsula, and Sumner was assigned to the command of the forces in pursuit. Heintzelman was in the advance before Sumner, and in his report states that his instructions directed him to "take control, of the entire movement." When Smith's division reached Skiff creek, on the left-hand road, the bridge was found to have been destroyed and Sumner ordered him to take a cross-road to the one on which the other column was moving. This brought Smith into the other road near the Half-way house just as Hooker's troops came up, forcing Hooker to halt for about 3 hours until Smith's command could get out of the way. Hooker then followed Smith for some 3 miles, when he crossed over to the road that the latter had left, and where Emory's cavalry was operating. Smith's division came up with Stoneman about 5:30 p.m. and by Sumner's direction was formed in three lines of battle to charge the enemy's works. About 6:30 the order was given to advance, but the dense undergrowth in the woods soon made it apparent that a charge over such ground was impracticable, and as darkness was coming on the troops were halted under instructions to attack at daylight the next morning.

The attack on the 5th was commenced by Hooker's division, which had marched until 11 o'clock the night before, and at 5 :30 a.m. was within sight of the enemy's works before Williamsburg. Two hours later Gen. Grover was ordered to begin the attack by sending the 1st Mass. to the left and the 2nd N. H. to the right of the road as skirmishers, under instructions to advance to the edge of the timber, where they were to turn their attention to the occupants of the rifle-pits in their front, as well as to the sharp-shooters and gunners in Fort Magruder. The 11th Mass. and 26th Pa. were then sent to the right of the 2nd N. H. and ordered to advance as skirmishers until they reached the Yorktown road. Webber's battery was next pushed forward into an open field on the right of the road, but before the guns could be brought into action it was subjected to such a heavy fire from Fort Magruder and a battery on the left that the cannoneers were forced to retire. Volunteers were called for to man the battery and the men of Osborn's battery dashed to the deserted guns, placed them in position and opened fire on the fort and the battery mentioned. Bramhall's battery was then brought up on the right of Webber's, and by 9 o'clock the guns of the forts were silenced the Confederates in the rifle-pits having in the meantime been driven back by the well-directed fire of Hooker's sharpshooters. Leaving the 5th N. J. to support the batteries, Gen. Patterson moved with the rest of his brigade to the left of the road in anticipation of an attack from that direction, and the heavy firing there soon demonstrated that the anticipation was being realized. Patterson found himself confronted by Pryor's and Pickett's brigades, outnumbering his own command five to one, and twice sent back for reinforcements, but receiving none gave the order to retire. The 73rd and 74th N. Y., the only remaining regiments of Hooker's reserve, were ordered to the left, and with their assistance Patterson rallied his men and repulsed the enemy three times after he had advanced to within 80 yards of the road, which was the center of operations. Hooker now ordered all his available troops to the left, and they arrived just in time to meet a fourth assault by Longstreet's whole division, which had just reached the field. At the same time the guns from Fort Magruder opened again and another body of Confederate troops advanced against Webber's and Bramhall's batteries, capturing 4 guns. Just then Berry's brigade of Kearny's division arrived on the field and repulsed the attack on the batteries, saving the remainder of the guns, the 5th Mich. charging with the bayonet and driving the enemy back to the rifle-pits with a loss of 143 killed and a large number wounded. Kearney's other two brigades-Birney's and Jameson's-now came up and relieved Hooker's men, who retired to the rear, where they replenished their ammunition and remained in reserve. The Confederates, seeing that the Union line had been strengthened by the arrival of these fresh troops gave up the attempt to turn Hooker's left and retired to their intrenchments.

Smith's attack, which was to begin at daylight, did not commence until about noon. Late on the evening of the 4th Sumner learned from a countryman that the redoubts on the Confederate left were unoccupied. A reconnaissance the next morning verified the information, and Hancock was ordered to move with his own brigade, part of Davidson's, and Cowan's M. Y. battery and occupy the redoubts. Hancock crossed Cub Dam creek on a narrow bridge, threw forward the 5th Wis. and 6th Me. as an assaulting party in case the redoubt should be occupied by the enemy. Finding it unoccupied he left three companies to hold it, formed a skirmish line in an open field to the rear, with the main body of his infantry behind in line of battle, the artillery in the center, and moved against another redoubt farther down the stream. This was also found to be unoccupied and was taken possession of by Hancock, who now sent back to Smith for reinforcements to enable him to hold the advantage he had gained. He then moved forward to drive the enemy from the two nearest works in his front and create a diversion in favor of Hooker, who was then seriously engaged in front of Fort Magruder. Deploying his line on a crest, with the artillery on the right and left of the redoubt, he threw forward a strong skirmish line and drove the enemy from his position, but did not take possession of it as the reinforcements had not arrived. Sumner had twice ordered reinforcements to Hancock, but each time had countermanded the order. Upon a third request for reinforcements he ordered Hancock to fall back to his first position. Doubtful as to whether this meant the first fort occupied or to retire across the creek, Hancock determined to hold on until he could communicate with Sumner, and again sent back for reinforcements, directing the officer to state the importance of holding the position. In his report Hancock says: "While I was awaiting a reply to this message the crisis of the battle in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have arrived; and in order to furnish all the assistance possible our battery threw percussion shell into that fort." This action drew attention to Hancock. Artillery was turned on him and D. H. Hill advanced with a heavy force of infantry to drive him from his position. Hill soon occupied the redoubts and Hancock's skirmishers became engaged with this force while a cavalry column came out from behind a point of woods on the right. This was held in check by the skirmishers, however, and Hancock gave the order to fall back to the crest and form in line of battle. This was taken for a retreat by the enemy, who now advanced. Hancock's men behind the crest waited until the Confederates were within easy range, when they suddenly appeared over the top of the hill and poured a murderous volley of musketry into the line rushing up the opposite slope. "Now, gentlemen, the bayonet!" cried Hancock, and the whole brigade charged with a vigor that threw the enemy into utter rout and drove him from the field with a loss of about 400 men in killed, wounded and captured. McClellan, in his report, refers to this action of Hancock's as being "one of the most brilliant engagements of the war." It was the relieving feature of the battle of Williamsburg, an engagement fought without a plan, without unity of action on the part of the different commands, and practically. without a commander. The repulse of Hill came about 5:30 p.m. Before he could reform his shattered lines to renew the attack darkness came on and the Confederates in front of Hancock bivouacked in line of battle, expecting to be attacked during the night. Late in the afternoon Peck's brigade of Couch's division came up and took position on the right of Hooker, where he held his position until the action was over. Had he arrived sooner Sumner might have been able to reinforce Hancock, thus enabling him to press the advantage he had gained on the Confederate left, which would no doubt have resulted in a sweeping victory for the Union arms. About the time that Hill was driven back loud and prolonged cheering was heard at Sumner's front, announcing the arrival of McClellan on the field. The enemy, however, regarded it as a signal that heavy reinforcements had come up, and during the night Johnston evacuated his position, continuing his retreat toward Richmond.

The Union losses in the battle of Williamsburg were 456 Killed, 1,410 wounded and 373 captured or missing. The Confederate reports show a loss of 288 killed, 975 wounded and 297 missing, but Heintzelman, in his report, says: "In the town the enemy abandoned all their severely wounded without attendance or the least provision for their sustenance. Counting them, the prisoners captured during the battle and the first day of the retreat, we got about 1,000 men; among them one colonel and several other officers. Up to Saturday 800 rebels were buried by our troops.

"Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

2nd Maryland Infantry.

About noon the advanced pickets of the 2nd Md. were attacked and driven in by a considerable force of Confederates. The outposts withstood the attack and in the sharp skirmish which followed the enemy lost 2 or 3 killed, a number wounded and 2
captured.

The regiment was drawn up to receive an attack, but it was not made and before nightfall, pursuant to orders, Col. J. Eugene
Duryee, commanding, ordered the regiment to withdraw.

Source: The Union Army, Vol.,6 p.,702

Washington, N. C., Sept. 6, 1862. Portions of 1st North Carolina and 24th Massachusetts Infantry, and 3d New York Cav-
alry. Just as Col. Edward E. Potter was leaving Washington with the 1st N. C. and 3d N. Y. cavalry the place was attacked
on the other side by a Confederate force variously estimated at from 600 to 1,000. The attack was a complete surprise to the
Federals remaining in the camp, but on hearing the firing Potter turned back and charged the Confederates just as they were
in the act of placing artillery to sweep the main streets of the town. After some hours of fighting, in which the Union gunboats in the river took a prominent part, the Confederates were compelled to retreat, leaving 2 of their dead, as many of their wounded and 20 prisoners in Federal hands. One of the gunboats, the Picket, blew up, killing 19 of her crew and injuring 6 others. The Union troops engaged sustained casualties to the extent of 7 killed, 47 wounded and 2 missing.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

Detachment of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, 12th Army Corps.

About 1 p. m. a report was brought to Col. Charles Candy, commanding the post at Dumfries, that a Confederate cavalry
force had attacked a Federal patrol 3 miles from Dumfries on the Telegraph road.

A party of the 1st Md. cavalry was sent out to ascertain the enemy's strength. Half an hour later the infantry pickets on
the same road were driven in and some of them captured. At the same time the Confederates opened on the town with shell. A
section of the 6th Me. battery was placed in position and replied shot for shot while the 7th Ohio was deployed as
skirmishers.

At 3 p. m. the enemy brought a portion of his force against the Union right, but finding it was unable to do anything mounted,
it was dismounted and again advanced, but was repulsed by the 66th Ohio infantry and the 12th Ill. cavalry, dismounted. The
Confederates withdrew at dark.

No casualties were reported.

Source: The Union Army, Vol. 5, p. 370 

Beverly Ford, Va., June 9, 1863. (See Brandy Station.)

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

3rd Brigade, 1st Division, 6th Corps; 2nd Brigade, 1stDivision, 11th Corps, and Pleasonton's Cavalry, Army of thePotomac.

Preparatory to the invasion of Pennsylvania, Lee concentratedhis army at Culpeper, Va.

In order to learn something of the enemy's strength andproposed movements Gen. Hooker, then in command of the Army ofthe Potomac, sent Gen. Pleasonton, with his three divisions ofcavalry, supported by Ames' and Russell's brigades of infantryand six light batteries, about 11,000 men in all, to beat upthe camps of Stuart's cavalry in the neighborhood of BrandyStation and, if possible, gain the desired information.

On the 8th Pleasonton moved from Falmouth up the north bank ofthe Rappahannock without being discovered. That nightBuford's division of cavalry and Ames' infantry lay at Beverlyford, waiting for daylight to cross the river.

At Kelly's ford, 6 miles below, were Duffie's and Gregg'scavalry divisions and Russell's brigade of infantry. No campfires were lighted and at dawn the whole force crossed theriver and moved toward Brandy Station, where the command wasto unite and march on toward Culpeper.

Duffie was to move via the Stevensburg road and the infantrywas to be used to keep open the line of retreat if the enemyproved too strong to overcome. Buford's division encounteredthe Confederate cavalry between the ford and Brandy Station.

This unexpected appearance of Stuart in his front somewhatdisarranged Pleasonton's plans. A sharp engagement was foughtat St. James' Church, in which Buford had to contend with fivebrigades of cavalry and about 20 pieces of artillery.

Finding that he was unable to break the enemy's line Bufordfell back to avoid being flanked out of his position and cutoff from the ford.

In the meantime Gregg had succeeded in getting to the rear ofStuart without being observed and began his attack just asBuford retired. For some time he engaged the wholeConfederate force on Fleetwood hill, finally being compelledto withdraw leaving 3 of his guns in the hands of the enemy,as most of the horses belonging to the battery had been killedduring the action.

Duffie came up as rapidly as possible, but owing to thedistance he had to march, did not reach the field until thefight was over. Learning that a large body of infantry wascoming from Culpeper to the assistance of Stuart, and havingaccomplished the object for which he was sent out, Pleasontonordered his command to recross the Rappahannock, which wasaccomplished without any interference from the enemy, who hadno desire for further combat.

The Federal loss at Brandy Station was 81 killed, 403 woundedand 382 captured or missing.

Stuart reported his casualties as being 51 killed, 250 woundedand 132 missing, but Pleasonton reported the capture of over200 prisoners.

One important result of this engagement was the capture atStuart's headquarters of a desk containing a number ofdespatches, by which Hooker learned of the projected invasionof Pennsylvania, and was enabled to thwart Lee's originalplans, compelling him to move through the Shenandoah valleyinstead of along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge as he hadintended. (See Stevensburg, same date.)

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5, p. 158

Middleburg, Va, June 17-19, 1863. Cavalry, Army of the Potomac. On the morning of the 17th Col. A. N. Duffie, commanding the 1st R. I. cavalry, less than 300 men, was ordered to move with his regiment from Manassas Junction by way of Thoroughfare gap to Middleburg, thence by way of Union and Snickersville to Noland's ferry, where he was to join his brigade. At Thoroughfare gap a strong skirmish line of the enemy's was encountered, but by making a demonstration on his left Duffie managed to pass through the gap, the enemy following on his rear but without making any serious attack. About 4 p. m. Duffie reached Middleburg, where he captured the first picket and ordered Capt. Allen to charge the Confederate detachment in the town. Allen cut off the rear guard of Stuart's cavalry and after a half-hour's fighting suceeded in driving it from the town. Duffie learned that Gen. Stuart, with 2,000 cavalry and 4 pieces of artillery had left Middleburg but a short time before, taking the road to Aldie. Orders were given to barricade the roads and Capt. Allen was sent to Aldie, where Gen. Kilpatrick was supposed to be, asking that officer for reinforcements. Skirmishing was kept up until 7 p. m., when the enemy appeared in great force on the roads from Aldie, Union and Upperville and surrounded the town. Duffie was determined not to surrender and disposed his little force to the best advantage to repel the assault that he now felt certain was to come. Three desperate charges were repulsed, in which the Union loss was 5 officers and 27 men killed, after which Duffie fell back to Little river, northeast of Middleburg and went into bivouac, throwing out a strong picketline along the river to guard against a surprise. A second dispatch was sent to Kilpatrick asking for reinforcements, but the party bearing it was never heard of afterward. At 3:30 a. m. on the 18th scouts brought in word that the roads in all directions were full of Confederate cavalry and the regiment started immediately for Aldie. It was soon met by a heavy fire and a demand for surrender. Instead of complying the fire was returned with vigor and for more than an hour the fight was kept up at close range, when Duffie reached the road to Hopewell gap. At 1:30 p. m. he reached camp near Centerville with 4 officers and 27 men - all that was left of his regiment. The colors were destroyed to prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy.

While Duffie was falling back from Middleburg Gen. Pleasonton, commanding the cavalry corps, sent Col. J. I. Gregg's brigade to make a reconnaissance in that direction and to assist Duffie if possible. Gregg reached Middleburg about 3 p. m., took possession of the town and held it until evening, when he was ordered to fall back toward Aldie. Next morning the brigade again advanced and a gallant charge by the 4th Pa. cleared Middleburg of the enemy, who took up a strong position on a wooded height about a mile from town on the Upperville road. About this time Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg arrived with the remainder of the 2nd division and immediately disposed his men for an attack. Dismounted skirmishers were thrown to the right and left of the pike, while the main body of the division was formed for a charge down the road. This charge was stubbornly resisted, but the Confederates were finally forced to give way, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. A large number were captured and the Union troops remained in undisputed possession of the field. Gregg's loss was not reported.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

Upperville, Va., June 2l, 1863. 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, Army of the Potomac. The enemy was driven from hisposition on Goose creek by Vincent's infantry brigade, and retreated rapidly toward Upperville, followed by the Federal cavalry, Gregg's (2nd) division in advance. At Upperville theConfederate cavalry was massed and their artillery was placed in position at Ashby's gap. Kilpatrick's brigade charged, but was repulsed. The 3d brigade, under Col. J. I. Gregg, now came up and formed on Kilpatrick's left, the artillery was placed in position, and with these supports Kilpatrick again charged and drove the enemy from the town, capturing 1 piece of artillery.A short distance west of the town the Confederates again made astand at the base of the mountain, where for a time they successfully met and repulsed Gregg's attacks counter-charging inturn, only to be forced back. Gen. Buford, with the 1st division, was moving to Gregg's assistance, when he became engaged with a heavy force of the enemy that threatened to come between him and Gregg. Col. Gamble, commanding the advance brigade,deployed the 3d Ind. and 8th Ill. to protect the flanks, andthese two regiments poured in such a murderous carbine fire that the enemy broke and fled toward the gap, closely pressed by the entire division. About the same time the force in front of Gregg gave way and the retreat became almost a rout. TheUnion loss at Upperville was 12 killed, 130 wounded and 67 missing. The Confederate casualties were not officially reported, but Gen. Pleasonton, commanding the Union cavalry corps, says in his report: "We took 2 pieces of artillery and 3 caissons, besides blowing up 1; also upward of 60 prisoners,* * * a lieutenant-colonel, major and 5 other officers, besides a wounded colonel and a large number of wounded rebels, left in the town of Upperville. They left their dead and wounded upon the field. Of the former I saw upward of 20."

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

Hanover, Pa., June 30, 1863. 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac. At 10 a.m. the division entered Hanover. The advance, the 2nd brigade, was attacked on the flank and the rear by Stuart's cavalry and was routed by the fierceness of the attack, but Gen. Farnsworth, by a gallant effort, rallied the confused and disorganized troops and led a countercharge, driving the Confederates from the town. The Federal artillery shelled the position which the enemy had taken and he finally gave way, thus allowing the division to rejoin the main column. The Federal loss was 19 killed, 41 wounded, and 118 missing; the Confederate loss was not so heavy, probably about 20 in killed and wounded, while some 50 were taken prisoners and a battle flag was also captured.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

Gettysburg, Pa., July 1-3, 1863. Army of the Potomac. After the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville the opinion became prevalent through the South that Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was more than a match for the Federal Army of the Potomac, and a clamor arose for an aggressive movement. There were at this time potent reasons why Lee should assume the offensive. An invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would have a tendency to draw troops from Grant at Vicksburg and Rosecrans in Tennessee to repel the invaders, thus relieving the pressure on the Confederate forces under Pemberton, Johnston and Bragg. If the invasion should prove to be successful European nations might be persuaded to recognize the Confederacy, loans could be obtained and probably aid secured to open the Southern ports, then in a state of blockade. All these reasons and possibilities were carefully weighed and toward the last of May Lee decided to make the invasion. Since the battle of Chancellorsville he had been lying at Fredericksburg, recruiting and reorganizing his army, which on June 1, numbered, according to Confederate reports, 88,754 men. It was divided into three corps, as follows: The 1st, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet, was composed of the divisions of McLaws, Pickett and Hood, and the reserve artillery under Col. J. B. Walton. The 2nd, under the command of Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell, included the divisions of Early, Johnson and Rodes, the reserve artillery being in charge of Col. J. T. Brown. The 3rd, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill consisted of the divisions of Anderson, Heth and Pender, and the reserve artillery under Col. R. L. Walker. In addition to these three corps was the cavalry under the command of Maj.- Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, and consisting of the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Hampton, Jenkins, W. E. Jones and Imboden, and six batteries of horse artillery under the command of Maj. R. F. Beckham.

Having decided to undertake an offensive movement, Lee chose a route along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, from which he could at any time threaten Washington or Baltimore, hoping by this means to detain the Union army in a position to defend the national capital, or failing in that to draw it after him and into a general engagement on a field of his own selection. He accordingly began the concentration of his army at Culpeper leaving Hill at Fredericksburg to keep up a show of force there in order to keep Hooker from ascertaining what was going on until it was too late for him to interfere. Through the medium of despatches captured in the affair at Brandy Station on June 9, Hooker learned that the major part of Lee's army was at Culpeper. He proposed to cross over the river and attack Hill, but the movement was forbidden by Gen. Halleck. He then suggested a movement against Richmond to force Lee to recall his army in that direction, but this, too, was forbidden, though either might have been successful. Hooker then sent the 3rd and 5th corps to guard the fords on the Rappahannock, to prevent the Confederates from crossing, and on the night of the 13th, moved his forces northward to Manassas Junction and Thoroughfare gap. This compelled Lee to change his plans and select the longer route through the Shenandoah Valley. The Federal force at Winchester, commanded by Gen. Milroy, was driven out on the 15th, Ewell pursuing across the Potomac and occupying Hagerstown and Sharpsburg. About the same time the Union troops at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg were withdrawn to Maryland heights, thus leaving the valley open to Lee, who crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown on the 24th and 25th, united his columns at Hagerstown, and pushed on toward Chambersburg, Pa. On the 25th and 26th, Hooker crossed the Potomac at Edwards' ferry and the next day Reynolds, with three corps, occupied the passes of South mountain, thus forestalling any attempt of Lee to pass to the eastward. To cut the enemy's communications with Virginia, Hooker ordered the 12th corps, then near Harper's Ferry, to march to that place, where it would be joined by the forces under Gen. Kelley on Maryland heights, and then, in connection with Reynolds, operate on Lee's rear. Again Halleck interposed an objection, deeming it inadvisable to abandon Harper's Ferry, and Hooker asked to be relieved from command of the army. He was succeeded by Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade on June 28. The Army of the Potomac was then organized as follows: Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds, formerly commanding the 1st corps, was placed in command of the left wing, Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday taking command of the corps, which consisted of three divisions under Brig.-Gens. James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson and Thomas A. Rowley, and the artillery brigade commanded by Col. Charles S. Wainright. The 2nd corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, embraced the three divisions under Brig.-Gens. John C. Caldwell, John Gibbon and Alexander Hays, and the artillery brigade of Capt. John G. Hazard. The 3rd corps, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, was made up of the divisions of Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney and Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, and the artillery brigade commanded by Capt. George E. Randolph. The 5th corps, Maj.-Gen. George Sykes, was composed of the three divisions of Brig.-Gens. James Barnes, Romeyn B. Ayres and Samuel W. Crawford, and the artillery brigade of Capt. A. P. Martin. The 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, embraced the divisions of Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe and Maj.-Gen. John Newton, and the artillery brigade of Col. Charles H. Tompkins. The 11th corps, Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard, included the divisions of Brig.-Gens. Francis C. Barlow and Adolph von Steinwehr, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz, and the artillery brigade commanded by Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. The 12th corps, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum was composed of the two divisions of Brig.-Gens. Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary, and the artillery brigade under command of Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg. The cavalry corps, Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. John Buford, David McM. Gregg and Judson Kilpatrick, and the horse artillery under Capt. James M. Robertson. Altogether the army had 65 batteries numbering 370 guns. Of these 212 were with the infantry, 50 with the cavalry, and an artillery reserve of 108 under the command of Brig-Gen. Robert O. Tyler, Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt being the chief of artillery. Meade took command in the midst of a campaign, and when the army was preparing to move through a region with which he was but little acquainted. For the time he decided to follow Hooker's plans, the only departure there from being to recall Slocum's corps from the Confederate rear, with orders to join the main column. Without consulting Halleck he ordered the troops at Maryland heights, now under the command of Gen. French, to move up to Frederick, where they were to act as a reserve when the army moved forward. Such information as he could obtain regarding the enemy's movements located Longstreet at Chambersburg, Ewell at Carlisle and York, where he was preparing to attack Harrisburg, and Hill in the vicinity of Cashtown. Conjecturing that Harrisburg was Lee's objective point, Meade determined to move directly toward that place and if possible strike the enemy before he could cross the Susquehanna. Orders to that effect were issued to the various corps commanders on the evening of the 28th and early the next morning the army was in motion.

Stuart's cavalry had been sent on a raid around the Union army, in the hope that by threatening its rear he could delay the crossing of the Potomac until Lee could capture Harrisburg. But he encountered Federal troops in so many unexpected places that his raid was prolonged to such an extent he did not arrive at Gettysburg until the battle was almost over. Being thus deprived of his cavalry, Lee had no way of obtaining information of the movements of the Federals, and up to the 28th, supposed them to be still on the south side of the Potomac. On the afternoon of that day he ordered Hill and Longstreet to join Ewell for an advance on Harrisburg. Late that night a scout came to Lee's headquarters with the information that Hooker had been superseded by Meade, that the Union army was north of the Potomac and in a position to seriously menace the Confederate line of communications. These tidings changed the whole situation. In his report Lee says: "In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions, but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains." Instructions were hurried to Hill and Longstreet to move to Cashtown, 8 miles northwest of Gettysburg, Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and Pickett was left at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. Owing to rainy weather these movements were performed somewhat leisurely, but Heth's division reached Cashtown on the afternoon of the 29th. That evening the Union army was in position just south of the state line, with the right at New Windsor and the left at Emmitsburg. Buford's cavalry division was on the extreme left, with his advance well toward Gettysburg. Buford sent Merritt's brigade to Mechanicstown to guard the trains and issued orders for Gamble's and Devin's brigades to move early on the following morning to Gettysburg, where he expected to find some of Kilpatrick's cavalry. The two brigades entered the town about noon, and found a detachment of the enemy within half a mile of the place. This was Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division, which had been sent from Cashtown to procure supplies, but finding the town in possession of the Union forces hurriedly fell back on the main body of the division. Scouting parties were sent out in all directions, bringing in information showing that the Confederates were unquestionably aiming to concentrate in the vicinity of Gettysburg, and Buford so notified Meade that evening. Pickets were thrown out toward Cashtown and Hunterstown, and the ridges west of the town occupied in anticipation of an attack the next day.

Meade's chief objects had been to force Lee to forego his intention of crossing the Susquehanna, and to bring on an engagement at the first opportunity. The field selected for such an engagement was along the banks of Pipe creek, a little stream 15 miles south of Gettysburg. With a view to meeting Lee at this point the different commands were so placed as to be easily concentrated along Pipe creek, while at the same time they were held in readiness to move elsewhere as the occasion might demand. On the evening of June 30, the 1st corps was at Marsh creek, about halfway between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg; the 2nd and 3rd were in the vicinity of Taneytown, the 5th was at Union Mills, southeast of Taneytown, the 6th was at Manchester, still farther east; the 11th was near Emmitsburg, Kilpatrick's cavalry was at Hanover, and Gregg's at Westminster. The information received from Buford caused a change in Meade's plans. Reynolds was ordered to move the 1st, 3rd and 11th corps to the support of Buford, Sickles relieving the last at Emmitsburg, and the other corps commanders instructed to move toward Gettysburg.

The town of Gettysburg is located about 7 miles from the Maryland line, and some 10 miles east of South mountain. It is in a valley, surrounded by broken granite ridges. On one of these, about half a mile west of the town, stood the Lutheran seminary, the elevation being known as Seminary ridge. It was covered with an open woods and at the north end is a knoll called Oak hill. South is a chain of hills beginning about 3 miles from town and running almost due north for a distance of 2 miles when it makes a curve to the east. At the south end of this chain is Round Top, just east of this is a smaller hill called Little Round Top; at the curve is Cemetery hill, while at the eastern extremity of the range is Culp's hill. About 500 yards west of Little Round Top, in the forks of Plum creek is a hill known as the Devil's Den. It is steep and rocky on the eastern side sloping away gradually to the west and is about 100 lower than Little Round Top. The summits of nearly all the ridges were covered with huge boulders, forming a natural protection to sharpshooters, etc. Near the western base of Cemetery hill was Ziegler's grove, and along the base of the ridge farther south were the Weikert and Trostle houses. Roads enter the town from almost every direction. Through the valley between the Round Tops and Seminary ridge ran the Emmitsburg road; along the eastern side of the ridge was the road to Taneytown, running southeast, between Cemetery and Culp's hills, was the Baltimore pike. These three roads came together near the cemetery and entered the town from the south. The Fairfield and Chambersburg roads diverged at the west side of town, the former running southwest and the latter northwest over Seminary ridge. From the north came the Harrisburg, Carlisle and Middletown roads, and Black's turnpike, while the Oxford and Bonaughton roads entered the town from the east. On the east side of town is Rock creek and west of Seminary ridge is Willoughby run, both flowing southward.

At daybreak on July 1, Buford held the roads and ridges to the west of Gettysburg with Devin's and Gamble's brigades, his vedettes being thrown out far enough to give timely warning of the enemy's approach. About 8 a.m. the scouts reported the enemy advancing in force from the direction of Cashtown. This was Heth's entire division, which had been sent forward to occupy Gettysburg. Gamble's brigade was formed on the left from the Fairfield road to the railroad cut, with one section of Calef's battery near the left and the rest of it on the Chambersburg pike. Devin formed on the right, extending the line to Oak hill, a portion of the men being dismounted and thrown forward as skirmishers. Heth advanced on the Chambersburg road, with Archer's brigade to the right and Davis, to the left of the pike, and the brigades of Pettigrew and Brockenbrough in support. About 9 o'clock Buford had three cannon shots fired as a signal for his skirmishers to open fire on the advancing Confederates, and the battle of Gettysburg was begun. Buford had been notified that Reynolds was coming to his support and determined to hold his ground until the reinforcements arrived. When the sound of the firing reached Reynolds his advance, Wadsworth's division, was within a mile of the town. This command was hurried forward across the fields, Reynolds riding ahead to Seminary ridge, where he met Buford and learned the positions of the contending forces. As soon as Wadsworth arrived three regiments of Cutler's brigade were formed north of the railroad cut and the other two south of the pike, Hall's battery relieving Calef's, which had almost exhausted its supply of ammunition. Meredith's "Iron Brigade" was sent against Archer on the left, and Devin's brigade of cavalry was faced north to meet Ewell, who was known to be coming up from Heidlersburg. Cutler's line had barely been formed when it was struck on the front and right by Davis. Col. Fowler who was in command of the two regiments south of the road, changed front, drove Davis from the field, and took possession of the railroad cut, capturing the two regiments which occupied it. Reynolds sent word to Howard to hurry forward the 11th corps, and then rode over to where Meredith and Archer were contending for a piece of timber, known as McPherson's woods, on the east side of Willoughby run. While directing the movements of this brigade Reynolds was killed by a shot from a Confederate sharpshooter, and Meredith was wounded by the explosion of a shell in front of his horse. Col. Morrow, of the 24th Mich., then took command, charged into the woods, captured Archer and about 800 of his men, and forced the rest to retire across the creek. By this time all of the 1st corps was on the field. Stone's brigade of Rowley's division was sent to the left of the pike, where it drove out the enemy's skirmishers and took position behind a ridge, being partly sheltered by a stone fence. Biddle's brigade was posted on the left of McPherson's wood, with Cooper's battery on the right, while Robinson's division was stationed in reserve on Seminary ridge. Reynolds' battery relieved Hall's and Calef's again joined Gamble's cavalry, which was also in reserve.

The enemy had also received heavy reinforcements, Pender's division coming up from Cashtown and Ewell's corps from Carlisle. Heth reformed his division south of the Chambersburg road, with Pender in support, and nine batteries stationed on commanding points west of Willoughby run. Lee had notified Ewell not to bring on a general engagement until the entire army was brought up, but on arriving on the field and finding Hill's corps already engaged he ordered Rodes' division to take position on Seminary ridge and Carter's battalion of artillery to occupy Oak hill. It was now nearly 2 p.m., when the batteries on Oak hill opened upon the Union lines an enfilading fire that forced Wadsworth to retire Cutler to Seminary ridge, where he was joined by Robinson's whole division to resist the advance of Rodes, who was following along the ridge with O'Neal's and Doles' brigades on the eastern slope and Iverson's, Daniel's and Ramseur's on the western. At 2:30 Rodes gave the order to attack. Iverson was confronted by Paul's brigade and O'Neal by Baxter's. O'Neal was soon repulsed and Baxter went to the assistance of Paul. At the same time Cutler swung his line around so as to attack Iverson on the right flank. Baxter's men from the shelter of a stone fence fired a volley at short range into the Confederate ranks, leaving 500 of Iverson's command dead and wounded on the field, and the rest surrendered. About 1,000 prisoners and 3 regimental colors were taken in this part of the engagement. Howard had arrived with the 11th corps about noon and assumed command. Shurz took command of the corps and Brig.-Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig of the 3rd division. This division and Barlow's were thrown forward on the right to check Ewell's advance, leaving Steinwehr's, with two batteries, as a reserve and rallying point on Cemetery hill.

Upon hearing of the death of Reynolds Meade ordered Hancock to proceed from Taneytown to Gettysburg and assume command of the left wing. Hancock arrived about 3 p.m. and found the Union troops retiring before the vastly superior numbers of the enemy. Early's division had secured a position on the flank and rear of the 11th corps, the artillery on the hills east of Rock creek enfilading its entire line. Up to this time the assaults of the enemy had been made without concert at various points along the line, giving the Federals an opportunity to repulse one before the next was commenced. But about 4 o'clock the whole Confederate line advanced-50,000 against probably 15,000. The odds were too great and orders were issued to fall back to Cemetery hill. The men retired in good order, fighting as they went, the only confusion being that which resulted by crowding the narrow streets of the town. Wadsworth's division was sent to occupy Culp's hill and skirmishers were thrown forward to the west side of the town to hold the Confederates in check until the new line of battle could be formed. About 5 o'clock Williams' division of the 12th corps came up and was stationed on the right and rear of Wadsworth. Geary's division arrived soon afterward and was sent to occupy Little Round Top and the ridge running toward Cemetery hill, in a position commandmg the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads. Stannard's brigade of Rowley's division also came up and joined the command, but too late to participate in the fight. These reinforcements greatly encouraged those who had borne the brunt of the battle all day, and the trains were sent to the rear out of the way to prepare for the action which was to come on the morrow. As the day drew to a close and it became evident that the enemy did not intend to renew the attack, Hancock turned over the command to Slocum and set out for Meade's headquarters at Taneytown. Orders were given for all the different commands to march at once to Gettysburg, Meade set out for the scene of action, and about 1 a.m. on the 2nd reached the field.
 

Notwithstanding Lee's order on the evening of the 1st to "attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable," the greater part of the day was spent in maneuvering for position. Longstreet did not want to attack until the arrival of Pickett's division. As a matter of fact Pickett did not come up in time to take any part in the second days, battle, and Law's brigade of Hood's division did not arrive on the field until noon on the 2nd. Considerable delay was incurred in moving the artillery so as to keep out of sight of the Union signal station on Little Round Top, so that it was the middle of the afternoon before the Confederates were in position to begin the general assault on Meade's flanks according to Lee's plans. This delay cost them dear in the end, as Meade's different commands were hurrying to the front and when the attack did come there was an opposition too strong to be overcome. As soon as possible after his arrival Meade looked over the ground and at dawn he commenced the formation of his lines for an attack on the Confederate left. The 12th corps was sent to the right of Wadsworth on Culp's hill, but Slocum and Gen. G. K. Warren, who had served as chief engineer under Hooker, and now held that position on Meade's staff, advised against such a movement. Meade, however, was determined to fight aggressively and began to arrange his troops for an assault on the enemy's left. Some time was necessarily spent in the preparations and before they were completed Lee attacked both ends of the Union line, thus forcing Meade to assume the defensive, which finally proved to be to his advantage. The Union line was formed as follows: Slocum on the extreme right; Wadsworth's division on Cemetery hill, with the other two divisions of the 1st corps at the base; Hancock's corps, which had come up during the night, next on the left; then Sickles; Sykes on the extreme left, while Sedgwick, who had made a march of 35 miles, arriving just before the attack commenced, was stationed in reserve on the Taneytown road behind the Round Tops, where he could rest his men until called on to strengthen some part of the line.

The Confederate line was in the form of a concave. Longstreet on the left was opposite the Round Tops; Hill in the center occupied Seminary ridge; Ewell on the right held the town and the ridges east of Rock creek. Along the north side of Little Round Top ran a road which crossed the Emmitsburg road almost at right angles near the center of the open country lying between the two lines. On the south side of this road and east of the Emmitsburg road was a large peach orchard, to the east of which was a wheatfield. Sickles moved his corps to the cross roads, forming Humphrey's division along the Emmitsburg road and Birney's in the peach orchard and on a ridge south of the cross-road, Ward's brigade being thrown forward to the Devil's Den. As this position was some distance in advance of the main line, and subsequently proved to be untenable, there has been some controversy as to whether Sickles occupied it by order of the commanding general or selected it himself. It is not the province of this work, however, to settle responsibilities, but to tell what happened. Birney's skirmishers were engaged almost from the time his line was formed until the main attack of the Confederates about 4 p.m. When that attack was opened Longstreet directed a severe artillery fire against the two sides of the angle formed by Sickles' line, and this was followed by a fierce assault on Ward, who was overlapped by the enemy's line and compelled retire. The attack was then extended toward the peach orchard and some of the enemy's batteries secured positions from which an enfilading fire was poured into the two lines forming the angle. Humphreys sent a brigade and later a regiment to the assistance of Birney, but soon afterward his own line was vigorously assailed by Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's on the west, making it impossible to render any further aid to Birney, who was now hard pressed. Graham's brigade was driven from the orchard, Sickles had lost a leg and Graham was wounded and a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. The Federal batteries, commanded by Maj. McGilvery, and which was stationed on the cross-road below the orchard, met the Confederate advance by an effective fire, but in vain. One of the batteries was captured by Kershaw's men, but the 141st Pa. made a gallant charge and recaptured the guns, bringing them off by hand. Still the Confederates pressed on, and as a last resort McGilvery ordered Biglow to sacrifice his battery to save the rest. With the courage born of desperation he obeyed the order, fighting until the enemy approached within a few feet, when he managed to withdraw, but with severe loss. This left the orchard in the hands of the enemy, which brought them on Humphreys' flank and Birney's right. Reinforcements were called for and Hancock sent in Caldwell's division, but it was compelled to fall back after losing heavily in killed and wounded, two brigade commanders, Cross and Zook, being among the killed. Ayres' division next went in, and, although he struck the enemy on the flank, doubled up their line and forced them back, he was in the end compelled to make a hurried retreat to save his command from annihilation.

This fight on the left was a struggle for the possession of Little Round Top. About the time that Ward was outflanked Warren rode over to the signal station there to obtain a better view of what was going on. Seeing the importance of the position which was then undefended, he assumed the responsibility of ordering Vincent's brigade of Barnes' division to occupy the crest, at the same time notifying Meade of what he had done and asking for a force sufficient to hold it. As Ward retired the Confederates, made a rush for the hill, but were met on the top by Vincent's men who repulsed the first assault with the bayonet. The 140th N. Y., belonging to Weed's brigade of Barnes' division, and Hazlett's battery were then sent to the aid of Vincent. Having failed in the first attempt to carry the position, the enemy next made an effort to turn the left, but were met by the 2Oth Me., under Col. Chamberlain. At first the Unionists were forced back by the main strength of superior numbers, but Svkes hurried a brigade to the relief of Chamberlain, and a brigade of the Pennsylvania reserves arriving about the same time, the Confederates were driven from the hill with a loss of 500 captured and 1,000 stands of arms taken, besides a large number in killed and wounded. After the 3rd corps had been driven from the peach orchard the enemy began to form in front of the wheatfield for another assault on Little Round Top. McCandless' brigade of Crawford's division, led by Crawford himself, charged and drove them to the farther side of the wheatfield, where they found shelter behind a stone fence. In the meantime two brigades-Eustis' and Nevin's-of Sedgwick's corps had come forward and during the time of Crawford's charge took a position in front of the ridge. The sight of these fresh troops had a discouraging effect on the Confederates and they withdrew from the contest.

Through some miscalculation Ewell did not begin his attack on the Federal right until after Longstreet's repulse. The plan of attack here was for Johnson to move against Culp's hill, and as soon as he was fairly engaged Early and Rodes were to assault the works on Cemetery hill. When the fight commenced on the left Ewell opened with his artillery and kept up the fire for about an hour before making any further movement against the Union lines. In this time Meade, under the impression that the demonstration on his right was merely a feint, withdrew from that portion of his line all of the 12th corps except Greene's brigade, and sent it to the support of Sykes. About 5 p.m. Johnson crossed Rock creek and advanced against Greene and Wadsworth. Greene held out until he was reinforced, when the enemy was driven from his front, though Johnson occupied the intrenchments that had been abandoned by the 12th corps, giving him a strong position on the right flank of the Union army. While this was taking place Early sent the brigades of Hays and Hoke, the latter commanded by Col. Avery, up the valley between Culp's and Cemetery hills to assault the Federal position on the latter. The advance was somewhat impetuous driving back Von Gilsa's and Ames' brigades, which were stationed at the foot of the hill. In the rear of this infantry line were Wiedrich's and Ricketts' batteries, which were next attacked, the former being captured and 2 guns of the latter spiked. Farther up the hill were the batteries of Stevens, Reynolds and Stewart, the officers of which had orders from Col. Wainright to "fight the guns to the last." As the enemy advanced in the face of these guns they were met by a storm of canister Stevens' battery especially doing effective work. Hancock voluntarily sent Carroll's brigade to the support of the batteries, which were also reinforced by the 106th Pa. and a detachment from Schurz' command. The arrival of these troops carried dismay into the enemy's lines, which had not been properly supported, although Gordon's brigade had been assigned to that duty, and a retreat was ordered. As they fell back they were followed by a shower of canister from the batteries, which killed and wounded a large number and threw the line into some confusion. It is said that the Confederate organization known as the "Louisiana Tigers," went into this fight with 1,750 men, of whom only 150 returned unscathed. Rodes was delayed in making his attack, having to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change front and march some distance. By the time he was in position to cooperate with Early the latter had met defeat. The day closed with the Union forces still in possession of the ridge, though the enemy had gained some advantage on the right, as Johnson still held the intrenchments of the 12th corps, which threatened the safety of Meade's army by cutting off the line of retreat if such a movement became necessary. This victory, meager as it was, offered Lee sufficient incentive to continue the contest the next morning. That night a council of war was held, at which it was unanimously decided to "stay and fight it out." It is said that Meade was somewhat displeased at the decision, because he wanted to retire to the ground previously selected at Pipe creek. However this may have been he acquiesced in the judgment of his corps commanders, and preparations were immediately commenced looking to the coming engagement.

Lee's general plan of battle for the 3rd was similar to that of the preceding day. Ewell was to open the fight by pressing the advantage already gained on the extreme right, and after his attack was well under way the main assault was to be made on the center. Johnson was reinforced by three brigades and instructed to begin his attack at daybreak. But a disagreeable surprise was in store for him. Geary returned to Culp's hill about midnight and learned that his intrenchments were in the hands of the enemy. He took a position with Greene and began making arrangements to recover his works at the earliest opportunity the next morning. Batteries were brought up during the remaining hours of darkness and stationed at all the points bearing on Johnson, and as soon as it was light enough to distinguish objects the guns opened fire. Johnson was without artillery, so he determined to risk all on a charge. The charge was gallantly made, but it was bravely met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division, and a severe contest was waged for several hours. Williams' division, now commanded by Col. Thomas H. Ruger, came up and gained a position where it could strike Johnson on the flank, and about the same time Shaler's brigade of Newton's division joined Kane, when Johnson, finding the conflict an unequal one, withdrew to Rock creek, leaving Geary and Ruger in possession of their old line. This part of the third day's battle was ended long before Lee's troops were in position to assault Cemetery hill, and again that concert of action, so essential to Confederate success, was lost.

Pickett's division, which had not yet been engaged, was selected to lead the charge against the Union center. Longstreet, in his report, thus describes the arrangement of troops and plan of the assault: "Orders were given to Maj.-
Gen. Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, Gen. Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack the enemy's defenses, and Gen. Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as Gen. Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it. Heth's division, under command of Brig.-Gen. Pettigrew was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Maj.-Gen. Pender's division, under Maj.-Gen. Trimble. All of the batteries of the 1st and 3rd corps, and some of those of the 2nd, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Col. Walton, chief of artillery of the 1st corps, and Col. Alexander had posted our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon a signal for the batteries to open." At 1 p.m. two cannon shots were heard in quick succession. This was the signal for the Confederate batteries to open fire, and immediately 150 guns commenced their deadly work. The object was to silence the Union guns, and when this was accomplished Pickett was to move forward to the grand assault which was to decide the fate of the battle. Owing to the convex form of the Federal position only 80 guns could find room on the ridge to respond to the enemy's fire. That number was already in position and for two hours was waged an artillery duel seldom if ever equaled in the annals of wars. The enemy's fire was very effective, although many of the shells went high and exploded in the open ground to the rear of the ridge, forcing the artillery reserve to move to a better protected position Meade was compelled to change the location of his headquarters, a number of guns were disabled, though they were quickly replaced by others brought up from the reserve, about a dozen caissons were blown up and after each of these explosions the exultant yells of the Confederates could be heard along their entire line. During this time Pickett's men were in the wood on Seminary ridge, waiting for the command to move forward across the 1,400 yards of open ground in their endeavor to pierce the Union center. The Union generals knew that this fierce artillery fire was but the prelude to a charge and placed their commands in position to receive the shock. About 3 o'clock Hunt ordered the guns to cease firing, partly to replenish his supply of ammunition, and partly to see what the enemy would do. Thinking that the batteries were silenced Pickett emerged from the woods and began his advance, his men marching with such even step that for a little while the whole Union line stood in silent admiration of this display of heroism on the part of men who were marching to certain death. But when about half of the open space had been crossed the Federal batteries again opened with telling effect. Great gaps were torn in Pickett's line by the shot and shell, but they were quickly closed up as the line pressed forward. When the Confederates crossed the Emmitsburg road canister came into use, and at the same time McGilvery's guns on Little Round Top opened a destructive, enfilading fire on the advancing lines. Still on they came. Hancock's skirmishers near the Emmitsburg road were driven back like chaff before the wind. The enemy had now come within musket range and Hays' division poured volley after volley into the left, causing it to waver so that it fell behind the main column. Before Pickett's first line reached the stone wall, behind which the main line of Meade's army was posted, Stannard found an opportunity to make a flank attack with his Vermont brigade. Quickly changing front with two of his three regiments, he brought them perpendicular to the enemy's line and sent in a volley that forced Kemper's brigade staggering back on the center. This was closely followed up by Col. Gates, of the 20th N. Y. militia, throwing Pickett's left into confusion and causing many to surrender, while others threw away their arms and took to their heels.

Although the two ends of the line were badly disorganized by these flank attacks, the center kept bravely on to the stone wall. Gen. Armistead, whose brigade was in this portion of the line, was one of the first to gain the wall. Placing his hat on the point of his sword he waved it above his head and shouted: "Give,em the cold steel, boys!" His example was speedily followed and with fixed bayonets the Confederates came pouring over the wall. One of the batteries was captured, the enemy's flag floated for a few brief moments over the Federal works, while the "rebel yell" resounded on all sides. But their triumph was of short duration. The place where the Union line was broken was directly in front of Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division. Webb rallied the 72nd Pa. and led it against the enemy; part of the 71st Pa. gained a position behind a stone wall on the right, from which they poured a murderous fire into Armistead's flank. The remainder of this regiment and the 68th Pa. found shelter in a clump of trees and sent a storm of leaden hail into the ranks of the assailants. Col. Hall, commanding Gibbon's 3rd brigade, made a dashing charge with two regiments of his own command, the 15th Mass., the 1st Minn., and the 19th Me. of the 1st brigade, that drove the enemy from the works and turned defeat into vitory. Back across the open space, over which they had marched with heroic determination but a short time before, the Confederates now fled in the wildest disorder. Of Pickett's three brigade commanders Armistead and Garnett were killed and Kemper severely wounded. Nearly three-fourths of his command were either killed, wounded or captured. As the enemy retreated, Stannard, who had held his position during the action, repeated his flank movement and captured a large part of Wilcox's brigade, which was coming up to Pickett's support. Lee's grand coup de main had failed.

While the main battle was in progress in the center there were sharp cavalry engagements on both flanks. On the left part of Kilpatrick's division made a charge through the woods near Devil's Den, against the infantry and artillery stationed there. In this action Kilpatrick lost a number in killed and wounded, among the former being Gen. Farnsworth. The affair on the right was of greater magnitude. Four of Stuart's brigades were ordered to cover Ewell's left, and to make a demonstration to divert attention from the main attack. Then, if Pickett's charge proved successful, he was to fall on the rear of the Federals or harass their retreat. Stuart planted several batteries on the hills commanding the Baltimore pike and made other preparations to attack the minute he heard that Pickett had carried the works on Cemetery hill. Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division became engaged, although he was under orders to join his command on the left, and continued the fight until he was relieved by McIntosh's brigade of Gregg's division. One of Stuart's batteries was posted near the buildings of the Rummel farm and Mclntosh undertook to drive it away. He soon encountered a strong body of skirmishers and sent back for reinforcements. Randol's and Pennington's batteries were moved to the front and soon silenced the enemy's batteries, when McIntosh moved up and occupied the position. W. H. Lee's brigade now came up to the support of the skirmish line and succeeded in repulsing the 1st N. J., whose ammunition was exhausted. The 7th Mich. was also driven back and it began to look dark for McIntosh, when the 5th Mich. made a charge on Lee and soon had him on the retreat. Just then Hampton's brigade, which had been kept in reserve by Stuart, came up and again turned the tide in favor of the Confederates. Although Custer had been relieved he had not yet left the field. Seeing the Union troops about to be overpowered he placed himself at the head of the 1st Michigan and shouting "Come on, you Wolverines!" charged with such impetuosity that Hampton's line was temporarily thrown into confusion. Custer's timely action put new courage into those already engaged, and for a few minutes every saber was busy officers and privates fighting side by side. Capt. Hart next brought up a squadron of the 1st N. J. and the Confederates gave way.

Beaten at every point the Confederates fell back to a strong position on Seminary ridge, where the army lay all day on the 4th anxiously expecting and dreading an attack from Meade, who was content to hold his position on Cemetery ridge. Some skirmishing occurred during the day and that night Lee's army, broken and dispirited, began its retreat into Virginia. The decisive battle of the Civil war had been fought and won by the Federals and the days of the Confederacy were numbered.

The Union losses at Gettysburg were 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded and 5,365 missing. The Confederate reports give Lee's losses as being 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded and 5,150 missing, but the records of prisoners of war in the office of the adjutant-general of the United States army bear the names of 12,277 Confederates who were captured at the battle of Gettysburg.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

Falling Waters, Md., July 14, 1863. 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions Army of the Potomac. While in pursuit of the Confederates after the battle of Gettysburg Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, commanding the 3rd cavalry division, learned that the enemy was moving toward Falling Waters and immediately started in that direction. At 7:30 a.m. on the 14th his advance came up with the Confederate rearguard about 2 miles from Falling Waters and the skirmishing commenced. Half a mile farther on Heth's division was discovered drawn up in line of battle on a hill commanding the road on which Kilpatrick was advancing. Heth's left was protected by earthworks and his right extended into a piece of woods. The 6th Mich., seeing only that portion of the enemy behind the works, made a gallant charge under the leadership of Maj. P. Weber, and although met by a heavy fire passed up to and over the works, then turned to right and returned to the main column, bringing in a piece of artillery, which was captured while the enemy was trying to get it in position in advance of his works. In this charge the regiment lost 30 in killed, wounded and missing, Weber being one of the killed. Gen. Custer next threw forward a regiment as skirmishers, but it was driven back, followed by the enemy until checked by the 1st Mich and part of the 8th N.Y. Kilpatrick now formed the entire division and pressed the enemy at all points gradually forcing him back toward the river. While the 3rd division was thus engaged with the Confederates in front, the 1st division, Brig.-Gen. John Buford commanding, made a detour and attacked them on the flank and rear, throwing them into confusion and scattering them through the woods and hills. In this flank attack Buford captured a 10-pounder Parrott gun, a caisson, 300 muskets and over 500 prisoners. As soon as the enemy's line broke under Buford's assault, Kilpatrick pressed his advantage and the Confederates were completely routed. This was the last stand made by Lee's army on the north side of the Potomac. The Union loss was 29 killed, 36 wounded and 40 missing. The Confederate loss was 15O killed, a large number wounded and 1,500 captured. Brig.-Gen. Pettigrew, commanding part of the Confederate forces, was mortally wounded early in the action. In addition to the prisoners captured the Federals brought off 2 pieces of artillery, 2 caissons, several hundred stands of small-arms and 3 battleflags.
 

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

3d Division, 2nd Army Corps.

In the Bristoe campaign the division, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays commanding, crossed Kettle run at Auburn at daybreak and
took the road to Catlett's station, on the Orange & Alexandria railroad.

Soon after crossing the stream, Owen's brigade, which was in advance, was attacked by a strong force of cavalry and
artillery. A light skirmish line was thrown forward, but it was quickly repulsed.

The skirmishers were reinforced by the 126th N. Y., supported by the 12th N. J., of Smyth's brigade. Seeing that the
Confederates were not disposed to attack, Owen then advanced his whole brigade, when the enemy retired precipitately,
leaving 28 prisoners and 7 horses in the hands of the Federals.

Among the prisoners was Col. Ruffin, of the 1st N. C. cavalry, mortally wounded. Owen's loss was 7 killed and 17 wounded.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5, p 232

Bristoe Station, Va, Oct. 14, 1863. 2nd Army Corps. On this date the corps was under the temporary command of Brig.-
Gen. John C. Caldwell, Gen. Warren being absent. After the engagement at Catlett's station in the morning, the command
pushed forward to Bristoe the object being to get possession of the Orange & Alexandria railroad, the line of which afforded a strong position for defense. As the advance approached the station Caldwell learned that the Confederates were advancing in line of battle to attack his flank. He gained the railroad and formed his line of battle with his own division (the 1st) on the left, Webb's (2nd) division on the right, and Hays' (3rd) division in the center the batteries being planted in the rear in such a position that they could fire over the heads of the infantry. Against this line Gen. A. P. Hill sent Cooke's North Carolina brigade without taking the customary precaution to advance a skirmish line to develop the Federal position. As Cooke advanced he was met by a withering fire of musketry, while the batteries in the rear poured a rapid fire of canister into his line, causing it to break in disorder, leaving 5 pieces of artillery and 2 stands of colors in Unionhands. The loss of the 2nd corps for the day, including the actions at Auburn and Catlett's station, was 50 killed, 335 wounded and 161 missing. A Confederate account says that their loss was 1,400 in killed and wounded. This decisive repulse checked Lee's advance and enabled the Army of the Potomac to take a strong position at Centerville.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

 Mine Run, Va, Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1863. Army of the Potomac.  At the time of this campaign the army of the Potomac was  commanded by Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade and consisted of the  1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th army corps, respectively under  Maj.-Gens. John Newton, Gouverneur K. Warren, William H.  French, George Sykes and John Sedgwick. The divisions of  Newton's corps were commanded by Brig.-Gens. Solomon Meredith,  John C. Robinson and John R. Kenly; those of Warren's corps  were under Brig.-Gens. John C. Caldwell, Alexander S. Webb and  Alexander Hays; of French's, Maj.Gen. David B. Birney, and  Brig.-Gens. Henry Prince and Joseph B. Carr; of Sykes', Brig.- Gens. Joseph J. Bartlett, Romeyn B. Ayres and Samuel W.  Crawford; and of Sedgwick's, Brig.-Gens. Horatio G. Wright  Albion P. Howe and Henry D. Terry. Kenly's division of  Newton's corps did not accompany the expedition, being left to  guard the railroad near Brandy Station. The cavalry corps was  under Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, whose division commanders  were Brig. Gens. John Buford, David McM. Gregg and George A.  Custer, and the artillery was under Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt.

While Custer's division of cavalry was attracting the  attention of the enemy in front of his position at Raccoon and  Morton's fords the rest of the army was to proceed to the  lower fords of the Rapidan river, Jacobs', Germanna and  Culpeper Mine, and cross simultaneously. French, with his  corps, was to proceed to Jacob's ford and his line of march  being closest to the then known position of the Confederates,  was to be followed by Sedgwick as a support. Warren was to  cross at Germanna ford and Sykes, supported by the two  divisions of the 1st corps, was to proceed by way of Culpeper  Mine ford. Pursuant to the above plan the army was put in  motion at 6 a.m. of the 26th, the heads of the 2nd and 5th  corps reaching their crossing places between 9 and 10 a.m. For some unknown reason the 3rd corps did not reach Jacob's  ford until noon. The crossing was then made at all three  fords, but the delay of French had so retarded the movement of  the whole army that it was nightfall before it was all on the  south side of the stream, and it was impossible for Meade to  reach Robertson's tavern that day as he had planned. French's  artillery could not be crossed at Jacob's ford because of the  steep banks on the south side and it was necessary to wait  while it was sent around by way of Germanna ford 2 miles  below. Meantime Custer's division of cavalry proceeded from  Stevensburg, took position at Raccoon and Morton's fords and  made a demonstration as if to cross. This movement caused the  enemy to move a heavy force of infantry into the intrenchments  and to open an artillery fire of 30 pieces on Custer, who  replied with his pieces and until dark the fight was kept up.  The army bivouacked a few miles south of the Rapidan and moved  at daylight for Locust Grove or Robertson's tavern the 2nd  corps arriving about 10 a.m. Warren's advance had quite a  skirmish with the enemy, whose pickets were driven in and a  number of prisoners from Ewell's corps were captured. Meade  ordered Warren to hold his position until the arrival of  French's corps, which was momentarily expected. About 11 a.m.  Meade received a despatch from French stating that his column  was on the plank road awaiting Warren's and a courier was  immediately returned to inform him that Warren was at  Robertson's tavern awaiting his arrival. At 1 p.m. another  message was received from French to the effect that the  Confederates were throwing out a force on the right flank of  his column on the Raccoon Ford road. Warren again ordered him  to hurry forward. Prince's division on advancing came to a  fork in the road and not knowing which to take, waited for 2  hours for an order from French. When it came it was for the  division to take the right hand road and after a time another  order was given for it to return and take the other fork. As  a consequence the enemy attacked again near Payne's farm, and  a severe fight ensued. Prince's line fell back and Carr, on  the left of Prince, had one of his brigades driven back some  distance, when the enemy was checked by a reinforcement from  Birney's division. These operations kept Sedgwick from  joining Warren, who was therefore on the defensive all day.  Gregg's cavalry division moving past the 5th corps advanced as  far as New Hope Church where it was briskly engaged for a  time, but succeeded in driving the Confederate cavalry until  it was reinforced by infantry. when Gregg in turn was  compelled to retire until relieved by Sykes' division, which  repulsed the enemy. Sykes had been informed of French's  failure to reach Robertson's tavern and had been ordered not  to advance beyond the church, so did not follow up his  success. Newton late in the afternoon was moved from the  plank road to Robertson's tavern to support Warren and during  the night the 5th and 6th corps also arrived there. Next  morning Meade made his dispositions to attack, but on driving  in the Confederate pickets it was found that the enemy had  abandoned his position. Pursuit was immediately ordered and  the enemy was discovered in a strongly intrenched position on  the west bank of Mine run. Convinced that there was little  possibility of success no attempt was made to assault, but  Warren's corps and one division of the 6th was sent to  demonstrate on the Confederate right. It took some time to  prepare for the movement so that the start was not made until  the next morning at daylight. Arriving at the position  desired the force was deployed and Gregg and Warren together  reconnoitered the Confederate position. About 1 p.m. an  advance was ordered and the enemy was driven 3 miles to his  intrenchments at the head of Mine run. It was dark before the  Federals were ready to assault, so the movement was postponed  until next morning, the 30th. During the day of the 29th  Gregg's cavalry had a rather heavy fight at Parker's store in  repulsing a force of Confederates attempting to get at a wagon  train in Gregg's rear. On the night of the 29th it was agreed  at a conference of the corps commanders that a simultaneous  assault should be made along the whole Confederate line next  morning. All the preparations were made, the Union  skirmishers having even advanced across Mine run and driven in  those of the enemy, when word was received from Warren that  after reconnoitering the enemy's position in daylight he had  concluded that it would be folly to attack. Meade hastened to  confer with him, but Warren's idea of the matter was unchanged  even after he and the commanding general had gone over the  situation together.

Admitting the failure of the expedition Meade determined  to withdraw and the army started on its return on Dec. 1, and  the next day reached the points from which it had started a  week before. The casualties in the Army of the Potomac for  the whole campaign were 173 killed, 1,O99 wounded and 381  captured or missing. The Confederate losses were not reported  for the campaign as a whole, but Ewell's corps (the 2nd) in  the Payne's farm and Mine run affairs on the 27th and 28th  suffered to the extent of 83 killed and 518 wounded.

 Source: The Union Army, vol. 6 

Spottsylvania Court House, Va., May 8-18, 1864. Army of the Potomac. At 3 p.m. on May 7, while the Army of the Potomac was still on the battle-field of the Wilderness, a messenger arrived at Grant's headquarters with the information that Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, had landed at City Point, completely surprising the Confederates there, and was ready to advance on Richmond. Lee had retired behind his works, leaving open the road to Richmond round his right flank, and as soon as the intelligence of Butler's successful beginning was received Grant issued orders for a night march of the whole army toward Spottsylvania Court House. (For the organization of the Army of the Potomac at this time see Wilderness.) From the Wilderness a road ran east to Chancellorsville, where it was intersected by another that ran southeast to Piney Branch Church. The Brock road ran in a southeasterly direction to Spottsylvania and about 3 miles south of it, and nearly parallel to it, ran the Shady Grove road. The former was in possession of the Federals as far as Todd's tavern and the latter was in the hands of the enemy. Beyond Todd's tavern the Brock road was held by the Confederate cavalry under Stuart. From the tavern the Catharpin road ran southwest and intersected the southern road at Shady Grove Church. Gen. Warren, commanding the 5th corps was to move by the Brock road and was to be followed by Gen. Hancock with the 2nd corps, while the 6th and 9th corps, respectively commanded by Gen. Sedgwick and Gen. Burnside, were directed to move by way of Chancellorsville and Piney Branch Church. Gen. Sheridan, commanding the cavalry, was ordered to "have a sufficient force on the approaches from the right to keep the corps commanders advised in time of the approach of the enemy." The trains and reserve artillery were moved to Chancellorsville in the afternoon from which point they were to follow the army. Nearly parallel to the course of the army ran the Po river on the south. The Catharpin road crossed this river at Corbin's bridge, the Shady Grove road at what was known as the Block House bridge, and the road running from Spottsylvania to Richmond crossed it at Snell's bridge about 2 miles south of the Court House. Some controversy and criticism have been indulged in as to why these bridges were not taken possession of by the Federal forces. Badeau, in his Military History of Grant, says: "These bridges were of first importance for they commanded Lee's only approaches to Spottsylvania, and Sheridan, who had been ordered to keep a good look-out toward the enemy disposed his force so as to secure all three positions. * * * Had these orders (Sheridan's) been carried out, every avenue to Spottsylvania would have been closed to the rebel army." Sheridan's corps consisted of the three divisions commanded by Gregg, Merritt and Wilson. His instructions to Gregg, issued at 1 a.m on the 8th, show the disposition of his forces with regard to the bridges. They were as follows: "Move with your command at 5 a.m., on the Catharpin road crossing at Corbin's bridge, and taking position at Shady Grove Church. Gen. Merritt will follow you, and at Shady Grove Church will take the left hand, or Block House road, moving forward and taking up position at that point (viz., Block House). Immediately after he has passed, you will move forward with your division, on the same road to the crossing of the Po river, where you will take up position supporting Gen. Merritt. Gen. Wilson with his division will march from Alsop's by way of Spottsylvania Court House and the Gate to Snell's bridge, where he will take up position."

Before the hour fixed for the cavalry to move, Corbin's bridge and the Block House bridge were both in the hands of the enemy. Snell's bridge was not used by the Confederates, nor was any attempt made to use it, because it was too far out of the way. When Lee learned, on the afternoon of the 7th, of the movement of the Federal trains, his first impression was that Grant was falling back to Fredericksburg and determined to interpose a force between him and Richmond. He therefore ordered Longstreets corps, now commanded by Gen. R. H. Anderson, Longstreet having been wounded in the battle of the Wilderness, to move to Spottsylvania that night, to be followed by Ewell's corps at daylight the next morning. Anderson moved at 11 p.m. and at daylight his advance had reached the Block House bridge. Had Gregg and Merritt undertaken to carry out Sheridan's order, they would have encountered this entire corps as it was marching along the Shady Grove road. In fact they would have met the enemy before reaching that road, as Hampton was on the Catharpin road between Corbin's bridge and Todd's tavern, Wilson did move forward to Spottsylvania, where he found Wickham's brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, which he drove from the town and held the place for two hours, when he was recalled by Sheridan just as Wofford's and Bryan's brigades of Anderson's command were moving to attack him: It was not the failure to carry out Sheridan's order regarding the bridges, but the presence of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the Brock road, that prevented the Federals from gaining possession of Spottsylvania Court House. Warren moved at 8:30 p.m. and was expected to reach the Court House by daylight on the 8th. At Todd's tavern he was delayed for more than an hour by the headquarters escort and 2 miles farther on he encountered the enemy's cavalry. Merritt was directed to move forward and clear the road for the infantry. The Confederates were forced back slowly, leaving the road obstructed by fallen trees, so that Warren's progress was necessarily slow. At 6 o'clock in the morning Merritt was relieved by Robinson's division, which succeeded after a sharp contest in driving the enemy from the road, but at this hour Warren's advance was still several miles from the Court House.

At 8:30 a.m. Robinson came out of the woods into the open fields. Of the Alsop farm, about half way between Todd's tavern and Spottsylvania. Here the Brock road forked, the two branches coming together again about a mile farther on. Robinson took the left hand road, Denison's brigade on the right, Lyle's on the left and Coulter's (formerly Baxter's) on the left rear. Griffin's division moved on the right fork with Bartlett's brigade in line of battle in advance, the brigades of Ayres and Sweitzer following the road. Robinson reached the junction of the roads before Griffin, formed his command in column of regiments and threw out a strong skirmish line in front. Near the intersection of the Brock road and the old Court House road the former entered a piece of timber. When Robinson's advance was about 300 yards from this timber the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry upon the front and right from a line of intrenchments just inside the wood. Robinson was seriously wounded at the first fire and, the national troops were forced back, closely pressed by the enemy, who tried to turn Lyle's left, but was prevented from doing so by the prompt action of Denison, who placed his brigade in the edge of the wood where he checked the further advance of the Confederates and finally compelled them to retire to their works. Soon after Robinson's division became engaged, Bartlett's line of battle came under the enemy's fire when about half-way across the open fields of the Alsop farm. At first Bartlett's men gave way, but fortunately just at that time Ayres' brigade occupied a sunken part of the road and under cover of this position the line was reformed. Griffin then advanced his whole division, Crawford came up with his division and drove the enemy from the woods on Griffin's left. The Confederate force with which Robinson and Griffin had been engaged up to this time was Henagan's and Humphreys' brigades of Kershaw's division, which had formed Anderson's advance on the Shady Grove road. When Kershaw reached the Block House bridge about daylight he heard the sound of the firing over on the Brock road where Fitzhugh Lee was engaged with Merritt and Robinson. Turning sharply to the left with the two brigades he reached the woods just as Lee was falling back, threw up temporary breastworks and awaited the Federal advance. He was followed a little later by Field's division, which came up on Griffin's right about the time that Crawford was driving the enemy from the woods. Cutler's division, the last of Warren's corps to arrive, came up in time to prevent Field from turning Griffin's flank and drove him from the woods after which the entire corps was pushed forward as far as possible and intrenched, the 6th corps coming up and intrenching on Warren's left.

Hancock, who was expected to move with the 2nd corps at 10 p.m on the 7th, was so delayed by other troops blocking the road that he did not begin his march until daylight the next morning. At 9 a.m. the head of his column arrived at Todd's tavern, where Gregg's cavalry was found skirmishing with that of the enemy. Hancock threw forward a skirmish line to relieve Gregg and then posted his division with Mott covering the Brock road to the right, Barlow on Mott's left, Gibbon covering the Catharpin road and Birney in reserve. About 11 a.m Miles' brigade of Barlow's division, one brigade of Gregg's and a battery was sent on a reconnaissance toward Corbin's bridge. When about half a mile from the bridge this force was opened upon by the Confederate batteries on the hills south of the river. Miles ordered his artillery to reply and formed his infantry in line of battle along a ridge in the wood, which position he held until about 5 p.m., when he was ordered to return to the tavern. On the way back he was attacked by Mahone's brigade of Hill's corps, which was then on the way to Spottsylvania. Miles repulsed two spirited attacks, holding his ground until after dark, when he rejoined the division. Gibbon's division was sent to the support of Warren and Sedgwick in the afternoon, but the remainder of the 2nd corps did not move toward Spottsylvania until about noon on the 9th. Then Birney and Barlow moved down the road about a mile, where they took a road leading to the right and joined Gibbon's division on the high ground overlooking the Po, the three divisions going into line of battle facing the river. Mott's division was moved from Todd's tavern to the left of the 6th corps at Alsop's. During the day Burnside moved with the 9th corps from his position near Chancellorsville down the Fredericksburg pike toward Spottsylvania. On the march Willcox's division encountered and repulsed a small force at the bridge over the Ny river, after which the command, Christ's brigade in advance, pushed on and went into position about a mile east of the Court House, where several assaults were repulsed during the afternoon, and where the division finally intrenched. The presence of the enemy on the Fredericksburg road led Burnside to report to Grant that Lee was moving toward Fredericksburg and Hancock was directed to force a passage of the Po for the purpose of making a reconnaissance on Lee's left. Although the stream was difficult to ford and the opposite bank was held by the enemy, each of his three divisions succeeded in crossing and occupied the Shady Grove road from Waite's shop, at the cross-roads between the Po and Glady run, toward the Block House bridge, which Hancock endeavored to seize, but darkness came on before the movement could be executed. That night Hancock threw over three pontoon bridges for the passage of his artillery early the next morning.

Lee became alarmed by Hancock's presence on his left and on the evening of the 9th sent Mahone's division to hold the Shady Grove road. Later Mahone was reinforced by Heth's division. As soon as it was light enough to see on the morning of the 1Oth, Hancock made a reconnaissance toward the Block House bridge with the intention of forcing a passage across it, but found the enemy strongly intrenched on the east bank. Concerning his movements in trying to gain possession of the bridge he says in his report: "After a careful survey had been made, I concluded not to attempt to carry the bridge, but sent Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division down the river to ascertain what could be effected there. Gen. Birney was directed to send three or four regiments out on the Andrews'
tavern road to cover Brooke's movement. Col. Brooke succeeded in crossing the river about half way between the bridge and the mouth of Glady run. * * * About this time I was informed by the major-general commanding, that an assault was to be made on the enemy's works on Laurel Hill, in front of Gen. Warren's position near Alsop's house. I was directed to move two of my divisions to the left to participate in it, and to assume command of the forces to be engaged in the attack." Pursuant to this order Gibbon was at once sent to the north bank of the Po and formed his command on Warren's right. Birney followed, leaving Barlow to hold the ground on the south side of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered that the Federals were recrossing the Po, he advanced in force against Barlow, who was instructed to fall back across the pontoons. The brigades of Brooke and Brown took up a position along a wooded crest about 100 yards in the rear of the works Barlow had constructed, while Miles and Smyth were ordered to fall back with their brigades to the bank of the river. Mistaking the movement of Miles and Smyth for a forced retreat, the Confederates advanced in line of battle supported by heavy columns and attacked Brooke and Brown, but the assault was repulsed. A second attack was made soon after and the combat became close and bloody, but again the enemy was forced back. In the meantime the woods on the right and rear of the Union line had caught fire and the flames now came so near that it was impossible for Brooke and Brown longer to maintain their position. Taking advantage of the lull thatfollowed the second repulse of the enemy the two brigades were withdrawn. This affair is known as the battle of Waite's Shop. Miles' brigade was the last to cross and as he was near the river Heth attempted to cross the open ground toward the pontoons, but was driven back by the fire of Miles men and the batteries on the north bank.

All through the forenoon of the 1Oth there were sharp skirmishing and artillery firing preparatory to the general attack which had been ordered for the afternoon. Gen. Sedgwick had been killed on the 9th and the 6th corps was now under command of Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. At 3:45 p.m. he was ordered to attack the works in his front with his whole command and Mott's division of the 2nd corps. Warren was also ordered to assault the works near the Alsop house with the divisions of Crawford and Cutler and the brigades of Webb and Carroll of Gibbon's division. Carroll charged through a belt of burning woods, the right of his line gaining the enemy's works and the whole brigade pressing up to the abatis, only to be forced back by "such a concentrated and murderous fire from two lines as to make the position untenable." Warren was also repulsed with heavy loss, Gen. Rice commanding one of Cutler's brigades being among the killed. Col. Emory Upton, with twelve regiments of the 6th corps, gained the parapet and engaged in some desperate hand-to-hand fighting, capturing several pieces of artillery and about 1,000 prisoners. His assault was to have been supported by Mott's division, but when Mott reached the open field he was met by an enfilading fire from the enemy's batteries, which threw his line into confusion and forced him to retire. The advantage gained by Upton was therefore of little moment, for the Confederates fairly swarmed against him, compelling him to abandon the captured cannon and fall back, though he succeeded in bringing in the most of his prisoners. Altogether the attack was a failure.

Lee's line extended from the Block House bridge northeast across the Brock road to the watershed between the Po and Ny rivers, nearly north of the Court House, where it turned sharply to the south, the right being near Snell's bridge. From his right center the works were thrown forward in a horseshoe salient around the crest of a spur between two small tributaries of the Ny river. Ewell's corps occupied the salient, Anderson's extended the line to the right and Hill's to the left. Directly. north of the salient, and about three-fourths of a mile distant, was the Brown house, while inside the enemy's works on the spur within the angle stood the McCool house. Very little fighting was done on the 11th, the day being spent in preparations for an assault on the salient at daylight the next morning. Mott made an attempt to drive in the enemy's skirmishers in order to develop the weak place in the Confederate works, but the effort was only partially successful. Wright was instructed to extend his left and concentrate on that wing. Hancock moved his entire corps after dark to the vicinity of the Brown house, and was to lead the assault. Warren was to hold the position vacated by the 2nd corps, and when Hancock began his attack Warren on the right and Burnside on the left were to engage the enemy in their fronts to prevent reinforcements from being sent to the salient. Hancock was to advance on a line drawn from the Brown House to the McCool house. The night of the 11th was dark and stormy, but the troops of the 2nd corps took their positions quietly and promptly, fully aware of the desperate character of the work awaiting them. Barlow's division in two massed lines was placed on the cleared ground which extended up to the enemy's line; Birney's was formed in two deployed lines on Barlow's right; Mott's division was in the rear of Birney, and Gibbon's was in reserve. The assault was to have been made at 4 o'clock but owing to a dense fog it was 35 minutes later before Hancock gave the order to advance. With even pace the troops moved forward in column and when about half way up the slope broke into a cheer, dashed forward on the double-quick through the abatis and over the works. Hancock describes the action here as follows: "Barlow's and Birney's divisions entered almost at the same moment, striking the enemy's line at a sharp salient immediately in front of the Landrum house. A fierce and bloody fight ensued in the works with bayonets and clubbed muskets. It was short, however, and resulted in the capture of nearly 4,000 prisoners of Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, 20 pieces of artillery, with horses, caissons and material complete, several thousand stand of small arms, and upward of 30 colors. Among the prisoners were Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson and Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart, of the Confederate service. The enemy fled in great disorder."

So far the assault had been a success. Elated by their victory, the Union troops pursued the flying Confederates toward Spottsylvania until they encountered a second line, the presence of which was unknown to Hancock or any of his officers. This line was held by Gordon, who checked the rush of the Federals and gave Lee an opportunity to push reinforcements into the angle. Lee was further aided at this critical moment by the necessity of reforming the Union lines, as in the impetuous charge and pursuit practically all semblance of a regular formation had been lost. The divisions of Mahone and Wilcox came up from the right and advanced against the 2nd corps before the disorder of its success could be overcome, driving Hancock's men back to the first line of works, where they were reinforced by Wright, with Russell's and Wheaton's divisions of the 6th corps( which came up on the right and vigorously assaulted the west angle of the salient. Again there was some stubborn hand-to-hand fighting in which Wright was wounded, though he remained with his men, cheering them on, and through the heroic efforts of Upton's brigade the line was held against the repeated and determined attempts of the Confederates to regain it. Hancock ordered his artillery to the high ground near the Landrum house and throughout the day charges of canister were fired over the heads of the Union troops into the enemy's line of battle. On Hancock's left Burnside assaulted the Confederate works at 4:30 a.m. and in half an hour had carried two lines of rifle-pits. Stevenson's and Potter's divisions then moved against the main line of works, a portion of which was carried by Potter, who captured a number of prisoners and a battery of 2 guns, but was unable to hold his advantage and was finally forced to retire with heavy loss. Several subsequent attacks were made by the two divisions, and also by Willcox's on the extreme left, but none succeeded in driving the enemy from his position. The persistent hammering of Burnside, however, prevented the enemy from withdrawing troops in his front to hurl against Hancock and Wright. About 9 o'clock Warren was directed to attack the enemy on his front, but upon attempting to advance his line was subjected to a heavy enfilading fire and he was forced back. Cutler's division was then sent to Wright and later the whole corps was withdrawn from its position and thrown to the left, where it became engaged against the west angle, but failed to carry the works. The firing was so heavy and constant that several oak trees inside the salient, some of them nearly 2 feet in diameter, were literally gnawed off by the bullets. Late in the day Lee gave up the idea of trying to recapture the outer line of works and retired to Gordon's line, half a mile to the rear, where he strengthened his position during the night. The losses on both sides were so heavy during the action that the salient has passed into history as the "Bloody Angle."

The attack on the 12th was the last of the hard fighting about Spottsylvania. Hancock was ordered to hold his corps in readiness to renew the assault at 4 o'clock the next morning, but owing to a dark and rainy night the other commands were not in position at the appointed hour to support him and the attack was abandoned. Artillery firing was kept up from the 13th to the 18th, chiefly to cover the movement of the army to a position covering the Fredericksburg road on Lee's right, and there was a slight skirmish near Piney Branch Church on the 15th. In his report Grant says: "Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th." This movement was interfered with by Ewell coming out of his works late on the afternoon of the 19th and attacking the Federal right near the Harris farm on the Fredericksburg road north of the Ny river. The attack was promptly repulsed, but it delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st.

The Union loss at Spottsylvania, during the ten days fighting, was 2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded and 2,258 missing. The Confederate losses were not officially reported and various estimates have been made, some of which place the total in killed, wounded and missing as high as 15,000. Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, who was topographer for Lee's army and author of the Virginia volume of the Confederate Military History, places the total loss at 8,000 and significantly adds: "but these were 18 per cent of the army."

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

Wilderness, Va., May 5-7, 1864. Army of the Potomac. On March 9, 1864, Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general and placed in command of all the United States armies in the field. The interval from that time until the 1st of May was spent in planning campaigns, and in strengthening, organizing and equipping the several armies in the different military districts. Grant remained with the Army of the Potomac, which was under the immediate command of Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, and which had for its objective the destruction of the Confederate army under command of Gen. Robert E. Lee. On May 1, the Army of the Potomac lay along the north side of the Rapidan river and was organized as follows: The 2nd corps Maj.Gen. W. S. Hancock commanding, was composed of four divisions; the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. F. C. Barlow, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, the 3rd by Maj.- Gen. D. B. Birney, and the 4th by Brig-Gen. Gershom Mott. The 5th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. G. K Warren, consisted of four divisions, respectively commanded by Brig Gens. Charles Griffin, J. C. Robinson, S. W. Crawford and J. S. Wadsworth. The 6th corps under command of Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. H. G. Wright, G. W. Getty and James B. Ricketts. The 9th corps, Maj.-Gen. A. E. Burnside commanding, was composed of four divisions, each of which was commanded by a brigadier-
general-the 1st by T. G. Stevenson, the 2nd by R B. Potter, the 3rd by O. B. Willcox and the 4th by Edward Ferrero. The cavalry corps, under command of Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, consisted of three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. A. Torbert, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer and the 3rd by Brig-Gen. J. H. Wilson. With the 2nd corps was the artillery brigade under Col John C. Tidball; the artillery of the 5th corps was in charge of Col. C. S. Wainwright; that of the 6th corps under Col. C. H. Tompkins, and the artillery reserve, composed of Kitching's, J. A. Tompkins' and Burton's brigades, was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Burnside had 14 light and 2 heavy batteries. During the campaign the 18th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. W. F. Smith, was transferred from the Army of the James to the Army of the Potomac. This corps was composed of three divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gens. W. T. H. Brooks, Godfrey Weitzel and E. W. Hinks, and the cavalry division under Brig-Gen. August V. Kautz.

Lee's army-the Army of Northern Virginia-consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps, respectively commanded by Lieut.-Gens. James Longstreet, R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill, and the cavalry corps of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Longstreet's corps included the divisions of Kershaw and Field, and the artillery brigade under Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander. Ewell's corps was made up of the divisions of Early, Edward Johnson and Rodes, and the artillery brigade of Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long Hill's corps was composed of the divisions of R. H. Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, and his artillery was commanded by Col. R. L. Walker. Stuart's cavalry embraced three divisions, commanded by Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and the horse artillery under Maj. R. P. Chew. The Union army numbered about 120,000 men of all arms, exclusive of Smith's corps. Lee's army numbered about 61,000 not including the forces under Beauregard on the Petersburg lines and the troops left in the defenses of Richmond, about 30,000 in all. Ewell's corps was intrenched along the south side of the Rapidan, his right resting near Morton's ford a short distance above the mouth of Mine run. The upper half of the intrenched line was held by Hill's corps, the left extending to Barnett's ford, about 5 miles west of the Orange & Alexandria railroad. Longstreet's command was at Gordonsville, the junction of the Orange & Alexandria and the Virginia Central railroads. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House, about half way between Longstreet and the line along the Rapidan, from which point he could easily communicate with his corps commanders, and detachments of cavalry watched the various fords and bridges along the river.

Grant's plan was to cross the Rapidan at the fords below the Confederate line of intrenchments move rapidly around Lee's right flank and force him either to give battle or retire to Richmond. As soon as this movement was well under way, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was to advance up the James river from Fortress Monroe and attack Richmond from the south. The region known as the Wilderness, through which the Army of the Potomac was to move, lies between the Rapidan the north and the Mattapony on the south. It is about 12 miles wide from north to south and some 16 miles in extent from east to west. Near the center stood the Wilderness tavern, 8 miles west of Chancellorsville and 6 miles south of Culpeper Mine ford on the Rapidan. A short distance west of the tavern the plank road from ermanna ford crossed the Orange & Fredericksburg turnpike, and then running southeast for about 2 miles intersected the Orange plank road near the Hickman farmhouse. The Brock road left the Orange & Fredericksburg pike about a mile east of the tavern and ran southward to Spottsylvania Court House, via Todd's tavern. The first iron furnaces in the United States were established in the Wilderness, the original growth of timber had been cut off to furnish fuel for the furnaces, and the surface, much broken by ravines, ridges and old ore beds, was covered by a second growth of pines, scrub-oaks, etc., so dense in places that it was impossible to see a man at a distance of 50 yards. Between the Orange plank road and the Fredericksburg pike ran a little stream called Wilderness run, and north of the latter road was Flat run the general direction of both streams being northeast toward the Rapidan into which they emptied. On the Orange plank road, about 4 miles southwest from the Wilderness tavern, was Parker's store.

From the Confederate signal station on Clark's mountain, near the right of Ewell's position, the Federal camps could be plainly seen. On May 2nd Lee, accompanied by several of his generals, made a personal observation, saw the commotion in the Union lines, and rightly conjectured that an early movement of some kind was in contemplation. He accordingly directed his officers to hold their commands in readiness to move against the flank of the Federal army whenever the orders were given from the signal station. It was on this same day that Meade, by Grant's instructions, issued his orders for the advance. Knowing that his every movement was observed by the enemy, he determined to cross the Rapidan during the night. At midnight on the 3rd the 5th and 6th corps, preceded by Wilson cavalry division, began crossing at Germanna ford. The 2nd corps, preceded by Gregg's cavalry, crossed at Ely's ford farther down the river. On the evening of the 4th Warren's corps went into bivouac near the Wilderness tavern, Sedgwick was between Warren and the Rapidan; Hancock was near the cross-roads at Chancellorsville and Burnside, with the 9th corps, was moving by a forced march from the Rappahannock river toward Germanna ford in response to a telegram from Grant. Wilson's cavalry covered both the plank road and the turnpike west of Warren's camp, the main body of the division being at Parker's store and a small force at Robertson's tavern on the pike. The orders issued that evening for the movements of the army on the 5th would indicate that both Grant and Meade believed that Lee would fall back toward Richmond upon finding his flank turned by a superior force. In this they were mistaken. Lee had outgeneraled Hooker on the same ground a year before, and he now decided to make an effort at least to drive the Federals back across the Rapidan. Therefore, as soon as he learned on the morning of the 4th that Meade's advance had crossed the river, Ewell was directed to move by the Orange turnpike, Hill by the plank road, and Longstreet was ordered to bring up his corps with all possible despatch. That night Ewell was bivouacked about 5 miles from Warren's camp, Hill was at Verdiersville, about 3 miles in the rear of Ewell, and Longstreet was at Brock's bridge, 10 miles east of Gordonsville.

During the night Lee sent word to Ewell to "bring on the battle now as soon as possible," and ordered Hill to move forward at the same time as Ewell. Warren's orders were to move at 5 a.m on the 5th to Parker's store and extend his right toward the Wilderness tavern to connect with the 6th corps. He moved on time, Crawford's division in advance, Wadsworth's in the center and Griffin's in the rear. About 7 o'clock Meade received a despatch from Warren, announcing that the Confederates were in some force on the pike about 2 miles west of the tavern. Meade hurried to the front and directed Warren to attack with his entire corps to develop what part of Lee's army was there. Hancock, who was moving to take a position on Warren's left, was ordered to halt at Todd's tavern and await further orders. Sedgwick was ordered to move by a cross-road that left the Germanna road at Spottswood, attack any Confederate force he might find in his way, and connect with Warren's right on the pike. Grant joined Meade soon after these orders were issued and the two generals established their headquarters on the knoll around the Lacy house, a little west of the Wilderness tavern.

At 8 o'clock Crawford was in a strong position on the Chewning farm, where he was directed to halt until Griffin and Wadsworth were ready to move against the enemy on the turnpike, when he was to send one of his brigades to join in the attack. About noon Griffin attacked vigorously striking Jones brigade of Johnson's division and driving it back in some confusion through the supporting line, after which he advanced against Battle's and Doles' brigades of Rodes' division. Wright of the 6th corps, was to have moved forward on Warren's right, but owing to the dense thickets and the uneven surface of the ground, he was unable to connect with Griffin's line in time to carry out the original plan of attack. As Griffin advanced, his right therefore became exposed and Ewell hurled the brigades of Gordon and Daniel against his flank forcing Ayres' brigade back across the pike. Seeing that his line was in danger of being broken, Griffin then gave the order to fall back. In executing this order his line was so closely pressed by the Confederates that he was compelled to abandon 2 pieces of artillery. Wadsworth, in moving forward through the thickets, lost his direction and exposed his left flank to Gordon and Daniel, just after they had forced Griffin to retire. These two brigades now attacked Wadsworth and drove back his left in disorder. The Confederates then poured through the gap thus formed and struck Dennison's brigade of Robinson's division in the flank as it was moving to Wadsworth's support. Pursuant to orders Crawford had sent McCandless' brigade to join Wadsworth's left, but the latter had begun his advance before McCandless could reach the position assigned him. The brigade was moved forward, however, in the direction that McCandless supposed would bring him into the desired place, and came up just in time to be engaged by Gordon's victorious forces after Dennison's defeat. A sharp fight ensued, but McCandless was greatly outnumbered and was finally forced to withdraw with a severe loss in killed and wounded and the capture of several hundred of his men. Ewell then reformed his line on the ground where he was first attacked and intrenched his position. Warren fell back about 300 yards and formed a new line with his right resting on the pike.

Early in the morning Wilson left Col. Hammond, with the 5th N. Y. at Parker's store and pushed on with the rest of his command toward the Craig meeting-house. Soon after Wilson's departure Hammond became engaged with Hill's advance and Crawford threw forward a skirmish line of his infantry to support the cavalry. This line soon encountered Kirkland's brigade of Heth's division and with Hammond's regiment was slowly forced back along the plank road toward the Wilderness tavern. Getty's division was hurried forward to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads, and a despatch was sent to Hancock directing him to move up on the Brock road to Getty's support. Getty reached the cross-roads just in time to secure that important position, and formed his division in two lines of battle at right angles to the plank road, Wheaton's brigade in the center, Grant's on the left and Eustis' on the right. Hill advanced against this line, but received such a galling fire that he speedily retired and for the next two hours everything was quiet, except for the almost constant firing of the skirmishers. When Hancock received the order at 9 a.m. to halt at Todd's tavern his advance was already some 2 miles beyond that point, and this caused some delay when, two hours later, he was ordered to move to the support of Getty. At 2 p.m. Birney's division came up on the Brock road and formed on Getty's left in two lines of battle along that road. The divisions of Mott and Gibbon followed in order, as fast as the narrow road and dense undergrowth would permit, and also formed in two lines on the left of Birney. Barlow's division, on the extreme left, was thrown forward to some high, clear ground, which was the only place along the line where artillery could be used to advantage. Here Hancock massed all his batteries except Dow's and one section of Ricketts', the former of which was placed near Mott's left and the latter on the plank road. As fast as the different commands fell into position breastworks of logs and earth were thrown up. The second line also threw up works in the rear of the first, and later a third line was constructed behind the divisions of Mott and Birney. Before his troops were in position Hancock received orders to attack, and a little after 3 p.m. Getty was directed to attack at once, without waiting for Hancock. During the lull of two hours Hill had been industriously pushing his men into position and forming a junction with Ewell's right. He was anxiously awaiting and expecting the arrival of Longstreet, but that officer had delayed his advance, because he was unwilling to take the road assigned him by Lee, and waited for permission to select his own route. The result was that when darkness fell on the 5th he was still miles away from Hill's right.

Although Getty received orders about 3 o'clock to attack at once, his advance was delayed an hour, as he was engaged in shifting Wheaton's brigade to the right of the plank road to make more room for the 2nd corps. At 4:15 he moved forward down the plank roads, but had not proceeded more than 300 yards when he encountered Heth's division. Ricketts' guns had advanced with the line of infantry and did good service in forcing back the enemy's center, but Hill's line overlapped Getty's flanks and the slight advantage gained in the center was more than offset by the severe losses on both the right and left, where the Federal attacks were repulsed, Grant losing nearly 1,000 men, about one-half of his brigade. Seeing that Getty had met the enemy in force, Hancock ordered Birney's and Mott's divisions to his support, and a little later sent Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division to the right of the plank road to support Eustis. About 5:30 the enemy charged and forced back the Union line for 50 yards. One of Ricketts' guns had to be abandoned on account of the horses being killed. Some of the Confederates reached this gun and planted their colors on it, but they were driven away before they could withdraw it. About the time that this charge was made Hancock had completed the formation of his line and attacked Hill's right with great vigor, Smyth's "Irish" brigade driving back the enemy's line for some distance. In his report Hancock says: "The battle raged with great severity and obstinacy until 8 p.m. without decided advantage to either party." While this was apparently true at the time an hour more of daylight would have witnessed Hill's defeat. He had extended his lines to the southward to cover the ground that had been assigned to Longstreet. This thin line was now shattered and disjointed, and had it been severely pressed for an hour longer it must inevitably have been broken at some point and the whole corps driven from the field. During the action Gen. Hays' commanding one of Hancock's brigades, was killed; Col. Carroll and Gen. Getty were both severely wounded, but neither left the field until the fighting was over for the day.

In the afternoon some heavy skirmishing took place on the Federal right. About 5 p.m. Ricketts' 2nd brigade, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, who had relieved Col. B. F. Smith that morning, Neill's brigade of Getty's division, and part of Wrights's 1st brigade, under Col. W. H. Penrose, attacked the Confederate brigades of Hays and Pegram in a strongly intrenched position on the ridge south of net run. Pegram placed some artillery on his left, the fire from which enfiladed Neill's line, forcing him and Penrose to retire from the field with considerable loss. Seymour continued the contest until dark, but was unable to dislodge the enemy from his position. The Federal loss in killed and wounded was heavy on this part of the field, Col. Keifer, commanding Seymour's first line, being severely wounded. On the other side Gen. Pegram was wounded and compelled to leave the field.
While these different infantry engagements were going on the cavalry was not idle. At the Craig meeting-house Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division encountered Rosser's brigade of Hampton's cavalry and drove it back about 2 miles. Rosser was then strongly reinforced and Chapman fell back on the 1st brigade at the junction of the Parker's store and Catharpin roads. Soon after this Wilson ordered his whole command to Todd's tavern, where he had been directed by Sheridan to meet Gregg's division. On the way to Todd's he was closely pressed by the Confederate cavalry. Gregg arrived at the tavern about the same time as Wilson, when the two divisions immediately assumed the offensive and drove the enemy beyond Corbin's bridge across the Po river.

Immediately after the fighting ceased on the 5th, Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick received orders to attack at 5 o'clock the next morning. Burnside, then in the vicinity of Germanna ford, was instructed to march at 2 a.m., with Stevenson's, Potter's and Willcox's divisions, and be in position to join in the general advance at the hour designated. From prisoners captured during the day it was learned that Longstreet was hourly expected and Hancock was notified to keep a close watch on his left. Barlow's division, with all the artillery of the 2nd corps, was therefore placed in position to protect the left flank and a strong skirmish line was thrown out on the Brock road. The Federal attack was anticipated by the enemy, who began firing on both the left and right a few minutes before 5 o'clock. Soon after the firing commenced, Hancock attacked in two lines, extending across the plank road, Getty's division, with Eustis on the right, Wheaton in the center and Grant on the left, supporting the divisions of Mott and Birney, the latter being in command of Hancock's right wing. The Confederates were pushed back about a mile and a half from the cross-roads when Wadsworth's division came sweeping in from the right, which threw the enemy into confusion and resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners. The whole line then pressed on after the almost routed enemy for nearly a mile farther; Lee's trains and headquarters were in full view and the battle was nearly won, when a heavy artillery fire was opened on the Union lines from Poague's batteries masked in the shrubbery on the south side of the road, and it was learned that one of Longstreet's divisions had finally connected with Hill's right. In the impetuous advance Hancock's line had become somewhat disordered and he ordered a halt to readjust his lines before engaging the fresh troops. Getty had been wounded during the action and turned over the command of the division to Wheaton. He was now relieved by Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division and formed his command along the original line of battle on the Brock road. At 7 a.m. Gibbon, commanding the left wing, was directed to attack the Confederate right with Barlow's division, but owing to the expected attack by Longstreet the order was but partially carried out. Frank's brigade only was thrown forward to feel the enemy's position and after some sharp fighting it connected with Mott's left. About 8 o'clock Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps reported to Hancock. Burnside, with his 2nd and 3rd divisions, had been expected to move by a cross-toad toward Parker's store, on Birney's right, and attack simultaneously with the rest of the line. About the time of Stevenson's arrival at the Brock road, Hancock received word from Meade that Burnside had then pushed forward nearly to the store and was ready to attack. This information proved to be erroneous and was in a measure contributory to the disaster that overtook Hancock later in the day. Burnside was delayed by a lack of definite information regarding the ground over which he was to move and the dense thickets he encountered, so that it was 2 p.m. before his attack was commenced. A few minutes before 9 o'clock Birney, Mott and Wadsworth, with part of Stevenson's division and three brigades of Gibbon's, resumed the attack along the plank road and were soon furiously engaged with the enemy. Just previous to this, rapid firing was heard in the direction of Todd's tavern, which Hancock supposed to be the threatened flank attack by Longstreet, and this caused him to send Brooke's brigade of Barlow's division out on the Brock road to occupy a line of breastworks there to hold Longstreet in check. Leasure's brigade of the 9th corps and Eustis' of the 6th were held in readiness to support Barlow. As a matter of fact Longstreet was at that moment in Hancock's front, the firing at Todd's being an engagement between Sheridan and the Confederate cavalry. In his report Hancock says: "The arrangements made on my extreme left to receive Longstreet prevented me from pushing my success at the time when Gen. Birney was driving Hill on the plank road."

South of the plank road and nearly parallel to it was the unfinished Gordonsville & Fredericksburg railroad. About 10 o'clock Longstreet sent Gen. Mahone with four brigades to move along the line of this railroad and gain Hancock's flank and rear, while the brigades of Law, Gregg and Benning engaged the Federals in front. Mahone first encountered Frank's brigade, which had nearly exhausted its ammunition and was therefore compelled to retire before the vehement flank attack. He then struck the left of Mott's division, which in turn was forced back in some confusion. Heroic efforts were made to rally the men and reform the line along the plank road by throwing back the left, but the troops had been engaged all morning under a heavy fire in the dense forest and their formation was too irregular for such a movement. At Birney's suggestion the whole line was then withdrawn and reestablished in the breastworks along the Brock road. When Longstreet saw that Mahone's attack was successful he ordered a general advance along the plank road, hoping to crush Hancock's line. Mahone's men, upon seeing the head of the Confederate column, mistook it for a fresh body of Union troops and fired a volley, killing Gen. Jenkins and wounding Longstreet. Lee then assumed command of his right wing in person and ordered the attack to be postponed, although the Confederate line was then within a short distance of the Union works. About half an hour before Mahone struck the left of Hancock's line Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division was driven back to the open ground near the Lacy house, but Birney sent two brigades and recovered the lost ground, though at considerable loss. During this part of the batt